In recent weeks, the media firestorm surrounding the rise of the radical jihadist group the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has been intense. No surprise. The story of ISIS’ rise has all the right elements to make for sexy headlines to feed the insatiable 24-hour news circuit: an elusive mastermind, an abhorrent ideology, medieval brutality, and a series of rather fantastic victories under its belt. Not to mention, its rise gives opportunity for liberal and neocon pundits to sling blame for the crisis at each other.
Above all else, though, these stories provoke fear and anxiety, captivating media attention as world audiences shudder at the prospect of a jihadist caliphate spreading its tentacles across the heartland of Middle East.
Indeed, there is a strong basis for these fears. In the chaos of the Syrian civil war, ISIS has emerged as one of the most organized and effective opposition groups to the government of Bashar al-Assad, eclipsing many secular and more moderate Islamist militias.
But its power has not stopped here. Taking advantage of widespread discontent among Sunni Arabs in Iraq with the bumbling Shia government in Baghdad, ISIS struck across the border bringing broad swaths of the country under its banner. Most stunningly of all, it unexpectedly managed to capture Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul, rich with plunder. The levels of violence administered by ISIS in its captured territories have been extreme, even leading Al Qaeda leaders to condemn the movement for its excesses.
Just as Hitler pushed Stalin and Churchill to work together, so can ISIS with today’s Middle Eastern powerbrokers.
But amidst all this, ISIS’ rise may prove to be a crucial catalyst for peace. It has managed to present itself as a mutual villain to nearly all of the Middle East’s major powerbrokers. The development of common enemies can be critical in bringing together people that would be otherwise hostile to each other.
Just as Hitler pushed Stalin and Churchill to work together, so can ISIS with today’s Middle Eastern powers. Iran does not want to see its fellow Shias in Iraq fall under intolerant Sunni rule, or its Iraqi ally troubled. America abhors the idea that the Euphrates Valley could become a safe haven for jihadists to launch transnational attacks. Even Saudi Arabia, perhaps the government most supportive of ISIS’ rebellion in Syria, has been alarmed by the group’s destabilizing venture into Iraq, and its expansion to the doorstep of the Kingdom’s own borders.
But as policymakers scramble to push back ISIS, they are realizing their limitations. Few Americans have an appetite for resuming a military role in Iraq. Neither Tehran nor Washington can be seen to be working with each other, lest they face domestic political objections. The government of Iraq has an army with infamously low morale and polarizing leadership detested in the country’s north. Thus ISIS is likely to remain a thorn in many countries’ sides for years to come, sapping the fuel from older rivalries.
However it is difficult to imagine ISIS managing to maintain its rule over conquered territories in the long term. Sooner or later economic malaise, international isolation, aggressive moral legislation, and a poor administrative infrastructure will undermine its hegemony in the upper Euphrates Valley.
But during its moment in the sun it may do what no diplomatic intrigue has managed yet –— drive Iran and America (and maybe even Saudi Arabia) closer together into a common front to preserve the status quo.
